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I. INTRODUCTION
By the end of the year 2000, the doctrine of shareholder primacy
seemed to be unchallengeable. It was winning ground in business
circles, while most economic and legal scholars depicted it as an
efficient corporate governance mode. Besides, the jurisdiction the
most receptive to this model, the U.S.A., exhibited exceptional
economic performances, at the peak of the so-called ‘New
Economy’. In continental Europe, the growing activity of financial
markets together with the rise to power of foreign institutional
investors were not favourable to the traditional model of the
corporation, where shareholders’ interest is only one among
others. As Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) provocatively stated:
‘Since the dominant corporate ideology of shareholder primacy is
unlikely to be undone, its success represents the ‘end of history’
for corporate law’ (p.89).
This doctrine is traditionally grounded in two different ways.
From a legal point of view, it is possible to consider that
stockholders are the owners of the corporation. In this case,
shareholder primacy fully protects private ownership, the
cornerstone of a free market economy. From an economic point of
view, one may argue that shareholders, as residual claimants, are
the only risk-bearers in the firm; therefore, they need to be in
control (see e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel, 1993). Yet it is now
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widely recognized that none of these claims is convincing (Stout,
2002). Most corporate lawyers admit that shareholders in widelyheld companies own their shares, which grants them numerous
rights (for example, the right to vote in general assemblies on
proposals included in the proxy statement). But they do not own
the company, as a legal entity, nor the firm as an economic
(productive) entity. Concerning the economic argument,
Williamson (1985), Blair (1995) or Zingales (1998) convincingly
stated that, when contracts are incomplete, non-shareholder
constituencies—and in particular workers investing in specific
human capital—do bear risk.
However, the proponents of shareholder primacy are increasingly
putting forward a new justification: shareholder primacy is
analysed as the most effective way to foster managerial (corporate)
accountability. The main reason is that it assigns a clear objective
to managers (the maximisation of the market price of shares),
together with numerous disciplinary and incentive mechanisms.
By contrast, a stakeholder approach would dilute managerial
accountability and lead to a (sub-optimal) ‘politicization’ of the
board of directors (see e.g. Bainbridge, 1993, Hansmann, 1996 and
Tirole, 2001).
In that case, it is striking that the unprecedented series of
accounting irregularities by leaders of U.S. and (to a lesser extent)
European stock markets, following the Enron disaster in
December 2001, did not result in a reconsideration of this
argument. The standard thesis explaining this major confidence
crisis in financial markets stresses the failure of the supervisory
actors, both external (mainly the auditors and the securities
analysts) and internal (the board of directors). This failure, in turn,
is explained by the conflicts of interest in these professions, and so
by an incentive argument. The present article challenges this
thesis, by considering that the generalisation of shareholder
primacy as a corporate governance mode is the main driving force
behind the crisis. As a consequence, the accountability argument
is reversed: shareholder primacy weakens, rather than strengthens,
managerial accountability. The intuition behind this point is the
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following: the implementation of shareholder primacy implies a
partial disconnection between access to internal knowledge and
empowerment. In turn, this disconnection favours erratic,
deceptive behaviours on the part of corporate insiders. This
‘cognitive argument’ therefore completes the ‘incentive argument’
in explaining the financial crisis of the Enron-era.
The article is organized as follows. In section II, the core of the
shareholder primacy doctrine is portrayed and the standard
interpretation of the crisis is critically assessed. Section III offers a
new reading of major authors—namely Berle and Means (1932),
Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972)—who laid the
theoretical foundations of our cognitive argument. Section IV
provides empirical evidence in favour of this argument, stressing
the limits of the supervision by financial market gatekeepers
during the massive financial scandals of the Enron-era. These
limits explain the opportunity for managers to extract quasi-rent
under shareholder primacy. Section V then makes clear how
deviant behaviours become effective, given the flawed incentives
provided for by ‘Value Based Management’—the use of
management tools to measure the creation of shareholder value.
Section VI concludes.

II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY: FROM THEORY TO
PRACTICE

A. THE BASIC FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
According to the proponents of shareholder primacy, corporate
governance deals primarily, if not exclusively, with the relations
between shareholders and managers, and these relations are
conceived in a strictly hierarchical fashion. The emergence and
expansion, since the 1960s, of the ‘contractarian’ approach to the
firm, in economics as well as in legal (corporate law) studies
(Cheffins, 2004), gave a formal shape to this idea. Prior to the
1970s, most economic scholars tended to consider the firm as a
‘black box’, a simple channel between different markets (labour,
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capital and product markets). Pioneered by Coase (1937), the
contractarian approach defends, on the contrary, the idea that
market mechanisms (i.e. voluntary agreements between rational
agents) are an essential part of intra-firm coordination. Describing
the firm as ‘a nexus of contracts’, the contractarian approach
emphasises the incentive (rather than cognitive) aspect of the
coordination.2 In this framework, managers are considered as the
‘agents’ of the shareholders, who are the ‘principals’. More
precisely, the concept of ‘agency relationship’ was introduced in
corporate governance debates by the Positive Agency Theory
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Borrowed from legal analysis, ‘the agency relation differs from
other fiduciary relations in that it is the duty of the agent to
respond to the desires of the principal’ (Reuschlein and Gregory,
1979, p. 11). Qualifying the relationship between shareholders and
managers as an agency relationship then entails the belief that it is
the ‘duty’ of the latter ‘to respond to the desires’ of the former, in
other words, that the managerial team has been ‘hired’ by the
shareholders to best serve their interests.
Yet this doctrine has to cope with one essential characteristic of
stock markets, at least in the U.S. (or in the U.K.): their liquidity.
This liquidity induces a dispersion of stock ownership. In turn,
direct monitoring by shareholders is impeded by the problem of
collective action: for each shareholder possessing an insignificant
fraction of the capital, the effort necessary to monitor managers is
much greater than the expected gain, thus giving rise to freeriding. As Berle and Means (1932) long ago recognised, the
managerial team enjoys great freedom and de facto power: ‘[the
shareholder] power to participate in management has, in large
measure, been lost to him, and has become vested in the ‘control’’
(p. 245).

2
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Herein resides a tension, which constitutes the matrix of the
shareholder primacy doctrine: stockholders are considered as the
legitimate possessors of power within the firm, but this power is
supposed to be wrested from them by the corporate executives,
leading to ‘agency costs’. In other words, shareholder primacy is
rooted in a philosophy of dispossession. This situation has led to
an exclusive focus on the question of control: how can the lost
power be recovered? The answer is by encouraging managers (with
their potential for misbehaviour) to act in the interests of the
shareholders and by establishing safety mechanisms capable of
detecting and curbing managerial misconduct.
The economic translation of this agency perspective is the
following: the objective of the managers is reduced to maximising
the utility of the pool of shareholders. Nevertheless, the
hypothesis of opportunism, at the heart of the contractarian
approach, requires analysts to acknowledge that managers will do
everything in their power to divert value. Shareholders must
therefore ensure that incentive contracts are signed, in order to
reduce conflicts of interest to the lowest possible level. Let us
denote V as the utility function of the group of shareholders, U the
utility function of the manager, U the manager’s reserve utility, w
his/her salary, and e(w) = {e+ ; e–} his/her effort (e+ > e–), then the
firm’s programme can be written as follows:
Max V (w)
w

subject to U (w; e + ) ≥ U
U (w; e + ) ≥ U (w; e − )

participation constraint
incentive constraint

In this model, the firm behaves in an optimal (second best) way
when it maximizes the well-being of the shareholders. To
simplify, the stock market price is often used to represent V, as it
incorporates expected gains in capital and future distributions in
dividends. Because share prices are primarily perceptions of value,
managers accountable to shareholders should therefore first and
foremost influence those perceptions.
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In this framework, all the mechanisms which favour the
alignment of managers’ interests with those of the shareholders
will improve the efficiency of the firm. Corporate executive
behaviour should, as far as possible, be dependent on stock prices,
that is to say on the selling and buying decisions of investors. Two
mechanisms play a decisive role: hostile takeovers (Manne, 1965)
and share option schemes. In both cases, depreciating share prices
have damaging consequences for executives (either in terms of
their careers or in terms of compensation). Yet these mechanisms
are effective if and only if investors are properly informed about
the quality of the management. A set of actors might help to
reduce informational asymmetries between the investors and the
insiders (the executives). Ultimately, the accuracy of the now
standard defence of shareholder primacy—as a corporate
accountability enhancing mechanism—crucially depends on the
functioning of these actors. These latter may be distinguished
according to their position vis-à-vis the business firm. The board
of directors constitutes the main internal supervisory device.
Following Fama and Jensen (1983), the board is depicted as an
institution whose function is to reduce agency costs by
monitoring and ratifying the actions of the managerial team on
behalf of the shareholders.3 Thus, exclusive control of the board of
directors by the stockholders constitutes an efficient arrangement.
This conception emphasises the ‘control’ role of the board at the
expense of its ‘strategic’ role, as an organ supporting executives in
their choices (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). This has a direct
consequence: non-executive directors’ independence from the
management is recognised as a cardinal value, preventing conflicts
of interest. Outside the firm, (external) auditors, securities
analysts and ratings agencies (the so-called ‘gatekeepers’) are held
responsible for verifying the honesty and relevance of financial
statements as well as for using the information to give the best
advice possible to investors.

3
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For the last twenty years, shareholder primacy has deeply
influenced the evolution of corporate governance regulations and
practices in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the
European Union. The rights of (minority) stockholders have got
stronger everywhere, primarily through federal law in the U.S. and
trans-national law in the E.U. (Cioffi and Cohen, 2000). In
addition, the activism of institutional investors (mainly pension
funds) has promoted best practices closely akin to shareholder
primacy. The growing success of a shareholder value-oriented
approach to managing a business can be observed on at least three
levels. First, the presence of independent non-executive directors,
mostly in the ad hoc committees (audit, nomination and
remuneration), is now the rule rather than the exception:
according to Finkelstein and Mooney (2003), outside directors
accounted for 75 % of directors in 2003 on the average board of
firms in the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500. Second, stock options
are increasingly used as a remuneration device for senior
managers: while they accounted for less than 25% of the average
S&P500 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay package at the
beginning of the 1990s, this part has stabilized to around 50%
since 1999 (Jensen and Murphy, 2004). Last but not least, ‘ValueBased Management’ is now a common practice for listed
companies (Cooper, Crowther, Davies and Davis, 2000; Hossfeld
and Klee, 2003). To conclude, for most of the commentators, at
least before December 2001, ‘managerial capitalism’, as described
by Williamson (1964) or Galbraith (1967), was over.

B. THE GATEKEEPERS’ FAILURE THESIS
On 2 December 2001, Enron was placed under bankruptcy
protection according to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. With
$63 billion in assets, this has been the largest bankruptcy in U.S.
history. The various investigations will show that accounting
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irregularities were systematic:4 heavy recourse to off-balance-sheet
accounting and creative accounting on the income statement
contributed to the misuse of value for the benefit of a few
executives. Astonishing as it sounds, this was not an isolated case.
In the months that followed Enron’s collapse, massive scandals of
listed companies in the U.S. succeeded each other. The
telecommunications sector was hit especially hard by the
bankruptcies of Qwest, Global Crossing and WorldCom.
WorldCom’s June 2002 bankruptcy even surpassed Enron’s in scale
($104 billion in assets, $41 billion in liabilities). But all sectors
were involved. According to a report published by the General
Accounting Office in October 2002, between January 1997 and
June 2002, nearly 10% of listed companies in the U.S. restated
their earnings at least once due to accounting irregularities.
Moreover, a study conducted by the Huron group demonstrates
that earnings restatements following financial irregularities are on
the upswing:5 they reached a peak in 2004, with a total number of
414. Ultimately, the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s
witnessed a dramatic increase in financial irregularities.
Recent decades have also witnessed a huge rise in executive
compensation. According to Holmström and Kaplan (2003), overall
CEO compensation increased by a factor of six during the 1980s
and the 1990s. Most of this increase took the form of incentive
pay—primarily stock options. This process has resulted in a
deepening of intra-firm inequalities, of which the Business Week
executive pay survey, regularly carried out, gives an idea: in 1980,
the average income of CEOs of the largest firms in the U.S. was 40
times the average salary of a worker. In 1990, it was 85 times
higher, and in 2003, it jumped to 400 times higher. From a strict
economic standpoint, such an increase raises serious concerns: it
is hard to explain on the basis of incentive factors alone, despite

4
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(2002).

5
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the effort made by some authors (see in particular Jensen and
Murphy, 2004). Rather, a process of rent extraction by corporate
managers seems to be at work here (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004;
Bratton, 2005). As such, this process can be considered alongside
the wave of financial scandals and accounting irregularities. Both
are the most visible marks of a structural phenomenon: a decline
in corporate management accountability.
The standard explanation of this phenomenon (at least of
corporate scandals) points to the responsibility of the
‘gatekeepers’. Coffee (2002) provides the most convincing outline
of this thesis. The (external) auditors, who verify and certify
companies’ accounts, and the financial analysts, who compile
information in order to make buy-and-sell recommendations on
securities, are those whose responsibility has been the most
emphasised. This failure of auditors and analysts is explained, for a
large part, by the conflicts of interest in these professions. For the
auditors, the conflicts arose over the course of the 1990s as audit
firms began to provide consulting services to their clients (other
than auditing). Conflicts of interest are also presented as the
mainspring of analysts’ misconduct: securities analysts most often
work for investment banks offering advisory services to the
corporations they analyse.
Besides the gatekeepers’ dysfunctions, Enron-era scandals also
revealed the weaknesses of the board of directors, as some
commentators judiciously noted (see for example Gordon 2002). In
the Enron case, independence did not prevent misbehaviour: at the
end of 2001, Enron’s board included 12 ‘independent’ directors out
of a total of 14.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA), promulgated in July 2002, was the
explicit response to the loss of confidence in U.S. security
markets. This text addresses two main issues. First, the SOA
tightens the regulation of gatekeepers in order to limit conflicts of
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interest. In particular, audit firms are forbidden from providing
6
certain services to the companies they audit. Second, the SOA
reaffirms the disciplinary role of the board of directors. The most
significant rule concerns the audit committee. The Securities
Exchange Commission is authorized to strike a company off the
exchange if its audit committee is not entirely composed of
independent members.7
Despite increasingly virulent criticism, the subject of stock
options is not even broached. In short, the SOA can be summed up
as follows: shareholder primacy is good, but its monitoring system
failed, mostly for incentive reasons. As a consequence, control
mechanisms accountable to the shareholders must be
strengthened. Yet this account might appear somewhat
paradoxical. Indeed, it is incongruous that the governance model
in the U.S.A., focused entirely on stacking up mechanisms of
control for the last twenty years, failed so spectacularly in
controlling corporate actors. This paradox might be expressed in
more general terms: never have managers been as powerful, or at
least as well-remunerated, as they have been since the alleged
return in force of the shareholders.

III. THE COGNITIVE ARGUMENT: SOME THEORY
In this section, we offer a solution to the previous paradox by
casting doubt on the effectiveness of shareholder primacy as an
accountability-enhancing mechanism. To do so, we choose to rely

6

Despite their ineffectiveness as gatekeepers from 1997 to 2001, securities
analysts are the objects of fairly inconsequential clauses aimed principally at
preventing conflicts of interest.
7

Even if the text does not specifically anticipate the obligation to put an audit
committee into place, it does specify that in the absence of such a committee,
all clauses dealing with this committee (notably the independence of its
members) must be applied to the board of directors as a whole. The constrictive
character of this clause leads one to conclude that the majority of listed
companies will create an audit committee.
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on three major theoretical contributions that join to stress the
intrinsic limits of an external control on the business company,
mostly for cognitive reasons. It is our argument that this idea may
be found in the institutional perspectives of Berle and Means
(1932) and Galbraith (1973) on one side and Alchian and Demsetz
(1972) on the other side—beyond their yawning analytical
divergences.

A. BERLE

AND

MEANS (1932)

AND

GALBRAITH (1973):

CORPORATE POWER AND KNOWLEDGE

Few books have caused as much stir as The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, written in 1932 by Berle and Means. These
authors examined the way in which the rise to power of the stock
company had affected private property, the main driving force of
U.S. economic dynamics in the nineteenth century. From a survey
of the 200 largest, non-financial corporations in the U.S. (presented
in Book I), the two authors noted the following empirical fact:
44% of firms were under managerial control. The ‘liberal
conception of ownership’ (Honoré, 1961)—where the owner is both
the beneficiary of the wealth created by the object owned and the
sole person capable of transforming its substance—no longer
applied to the real situation of shareholders. According to Berle
and Means, shareholders of public corporations were just owners
of an equity stake in a company. This ownership gave them
certain rights, but it was no longer sufficient to provide
shareholders with control of the company. In practical terms,
therefore, the shareholders were no longer owners of firms.
Book II was devoted to an analysis of the jurisprudence of the
time. This analysis demonstrated that U.S. jurisprudence did not
apprehend the full measure of the transformations presented in
Book I. Thus, the U.S. judicial system continued to cling to the
liberal, classical concept of ownership. The legal order therefore
reaffirmed shareholder primacy. This revealed a certain lag in the
legal order in relation to the social and economic reality, as well as
underscoring the failure of the legal order to discipline corporate
managers. Indeed, detailed analysis of the jurisprudence showed
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that the stacking of legal measures, with the aim of ensuring
shareholder control despite the dispersion of equity capital, was
totally insufficient for restoring shareholder power:
As the power of the corporate management has increased, and as
the control of the individual has sunk into the background, the
tendency of the law has been to stiffen its assertion of the rights of
security holder. The thing that it has not been able to stiffen has
been its regulation of the conduct of the business by the corporate
management. And this omission has resulted, not from lack of
logical justification, but from lack of ability to handle the
problems involved. The management of an enterprise is, by nature,
a task which courts can not assume; and the various devices by
which management and control have absorbed a portion of the
profit-stream have been so intimately related to the business
conduct of an enterprise, that the courts seem to have felt not only
reluctant to interfere, but positively afraid to do so (Berle and
Means, 1932, p. 296).
This quotation clarifies the reasons behind the legal system’s
incapacity effectively to control the misappropriation of corporate
wealth by managers: these misappropriations proceed, for the most
part, from the very process of management itself. It is, for
example, by choosing to take over a given firm or to invest in a
given market that the executives increase their wealth and power
at the expense of shareholders. Managers can always justify their
choices by invoking industrial strategy, a justification that is
practically impossible for the law to contest. And the reason is
simple: courts are exterior to the firm as much as the shareholders
concerned with preserving the liquidity of their shares.
Ultimately, cases of pure embezzlement, objectively perceptible
by the law (insider trading, for example, or misuse of corporate
property), are relatively rare. This fact is at the root of the so-called
‘business judgement rule’, according to which U.S. courts give
managers broad discretion.
This analysis of the courts’ structural inability to discipline
managers did not attract much attention from subsequent

2007]

SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

13

commentators, as compared to the free riding problem stemming
from the dispersion of ownership. And yet it has profound insights
for current debates on corporate governance. Not only did Berle
and Means (1932) emphasise the difficulty for ‘liquid’ shareholders
to control corporate executives; they also underlined the intrinsic
limits of purely external control. Courts have the (legal) power to
discipline corporate executives, but they lack reliable information
to do so in a rational, effective manner. Because they are remote
from day-to-day business conduct, courts lack the knowledge of
business conduct, of the firm as a productive entity, necessary to
monitor managerial behaviour. In fine, Berle and Means (1932)
shed light on the cognitive limitations of courts as a corporate
management control mechanism.
This insight has been further developed by Galbraith (1973),8 who
forcefully argues that the power of corporate insiders derives from,
and is justified by, the informational advantage that they enjoy
over liquid shareholders. Even to the limited extent that any
shareholder or financial institution were sufficiently disposed to
intervene from time to time in the operational affairs of the
companies, any action that they took or demands that they made
in this regard would be inherently irrational, given the inability of
these `outsiders' to acquire sufficient information or expertise to
be able accurately to pass judgement on the merits of managers'
strategic decisions. According to Galbraith (1973), not only were
shareholders physically detached from the day-to-day affairs of the
business, but they were also excluded from the corporate
‘technostructure’. The technostructure is defined as the collective
body of corporate officers who, by virtue of the supremacy that
they enjoyed over the base of scientific and technical skills,
knowledge and expertise upon which the company's operations
were dependent, enjoyed the exclusive capacity to command
strategic control over all business affairs. In other words, Galbraith
believed that, in the modern corporate economy, where operations

8

I would like to thank Marc Moore for this reference.
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were increasingly technical and specialised in nature, the ‘real’
power within the large company rested with those that possessed
the relevant knowledge, rather than the wealth, that comprised
the business, thereby excluding shareholders from the realm of
effective corporate control.

B. ALCHIAN

AND

DEMSETZ (1972):

TEAM PRODUCTION AND

LIQUID SHAREHOLDERS

The parallel between Berle and Means and Galbraith is hardly a
surprise, given the intellectual proximity between them. However,
it is probably more unusual to bring together Alchian and
Demsetz (1972) with the authors of The Modern Corporation.
Indeed Alchian and Demsetz laid down the basic foundations of
the contractarian approach, which was later to constitute the main
critic of the stakeholder approach to corporate governance, often
associated with Berle and Means. However, and somewhat
paradoxically, Alchian and Demsetz’s argument is at odds with
the principle of shareholder primacy. The originality of their
contribution, inside the contractarian approach, is related to their
specific focus on the productive dimension of intra-firm
coordination.
More precisely, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that much of
the productive process involves ‘team production’: by definition,
team production occurs whenever overall output (y) is greater than
the sum of individual contributions or investments (ei, i=1, …, n),
due to the complementarities of human assets. The production
function is then nonseparable:
y = y (e1 ;… ; en) , with

∂2 y
> 0 , j ≠i
∂ ei ∂ e j

Team production has two major implications. On the one hand, it
implies that the individuals involved in the team produce
“organizational” rent, as a result of a specific combination of
assets (here, mainly human assets). On the other hand, it is hard to
attribute any particular portion of the gains to any particular
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member’s contribution. Yet in a standard, neo-classical
framework, allocative efficiency recommends that individual
retribution should equal individual marginal productivity:
otherwise, free riding occurs. The crux of the problem is then the
following: how can one profit from the synergy gains made
possible by team production when individual contributions cannot
easily be inferred from the output? Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
add a crucial assumption: individual productivity may be inferred
not from the observation of output (that is from outside), but from
the observation of individual behaviour (that is from inside). And
this inference is made easier for an individual who has, prior to the
production process, assigned and dictated jobs.
In these conditions, the solution put forward by Alchian and
Demsetz is to select a supervision (monitoring) specialist at the
head of the team. The specialist’s role is to oversee how the
individuals perform (right 1) in order to come to a precise
evaluation of their marginal productivity and thus to adapt their
remuneration accordingly. To ease this supervision function, the
right to assign and dictate jobs to the other members of the team is
given to the monitor (right 2). If this latter performs his or her task
well, each of the members will be rewarded for their marginal
productivity and an efficient allocation attained. The appropriate
incentive measure in this case is to make the monitor the residual
beneficiary of the team (right 3). Beyond the right to supervise (1),
to assign tasks and to organise production (2), and to obtain the
residual gains (3), Alchian and Demsetz grant the specialist the
right to resell the preceding rights (right 4). Finally, Alchian and
Demsetz stress the exact correspondence between their central
agent and the owner of the capitalist firm as the latter is
traditionally defined. And this is precisely how they demonstrate
the efficiency of the capitalist firm, born from the desire to profit
from the synergy gains of team production, all the while avoiding
the incentive problems raised by this type of activity.
Yet we would argue that the very structure of their model is in
contradiction to the principle of shareholder primacy. To see this,
one should note that authority (i.e. the right to assign tasks and to
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organise production) and residual claim are allocated to the central
agent because he is the supervisor. It is because he is in charge of
supervising (right 1) that he is granted the power to decide who
should do what (right 2) and the residual income (right 3). This is
exactly the opposite of the traditional economic argument (see
supra), where the ultimate authority is given to the stakeholders
who bear the risk (namely the stockholders). In Alchian and
Demsetz, risk-bearing is backed onto control and supervision. The
crucial point is that the supervising function cannot be exercised,
by definition, outside the team (the firm). Being part of the team
(an insider) induces a specific knowledge about the origin of profit
(organizational rent), and this knowledge lies at the very
foundation of authority and power. Any attempt to empower
liquid shareholders therefore comes up against this cognitive
issue: authority should, by definition, be located inside the firm as
a productive entity.
In sum, focusing on team production leads to reservations—to say
the least—about shareholder primacy, an original standpoint
within the contractarian paradigm.9 The following quotation,
where Alchian and Demsetz tend to minimise the role of
shareholders, should not come as a surprise:
Instead of thinking of shareholders as joint owners, we
can think of them as investors, like bondholders, except
that the stockholders are more optimistic than
bondholders about the enterprise prospects. […] The
residual claim on earnings enjoyed by shareholders does
not serve the function of enhancing their efficiency as
monitors in the general situation. The stockholders are
‘merely’ the less risk-averse or the more optimistic
members of the group that finances the firm. […] [So]
why should stockholders be regarded as ‘owners’ in any

9

But note that Blair and Stout (1999) or Kaufman and Englander (2005) develop a
similar argument.
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sense distinct from the other financial investors? The
entrepreneur-organizer, who let us assume is the chief
operating officer and sole repository of control of the
corporation, does not find his authority residing in
common stockholders (except in the case of a take over).
[…] In sum, is it the case that the stockholder […]
relationship is one emanating from the division of
ownership among several people, or is it that the
collection of investment funds from people of varying
anticipations is the underlying factor? If the latter, why
should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom
voting rights, whatever they may signify or however
exercisable, should reside in order to enhance efficiency?
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p. 789)
In this section, we have sought to show that Berle and Means
(1932), Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) share a
common argument, despite their obvious methodological and
theoretical divergences: they all stress the specificity of the
productive activity—the source of corporate profit as an
organizational quasi-rent—and the intrinsic limitations on the
evaluation of this activity by outsiders. In this context,
shareholder primacy attempts to empower those stakeholders
whose firm-specific knowledge is the least developed. As such, the
implementation of shareholder primacy implies a partial
disconnection between access to internal knowledge and
empowerment. This disconnection raises serious concern: those
vested with ultimate control rights and whose interests are
supposed to be served (shareholders) are intrinsically limited in
their ability to assess corporate activity. Control of managerial
accountability is fully exteriorized, increasing the opportunity for
fraudulent behaviour. The next section provides empirical
evidence to support this argument, taken from the massive postbubble corporate financial scandals: in particular, we illustrate the
limits of the monitoring devices upon which a shareholderoriented model relies.
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IV. THE COGNITIVE ARGUMENT: SOME EVIDENCE
In this section, we successively consider the case of the two sets of
supervisory actors who are, in a shareholder-oriented model of
corporate governance, in charge of reducing informational
asymmetries between insiders and shareholders: directors and
external gatekeepers.

A. THE CASE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
According to institutional investors as well as proponents of
shareholder primacy, the raison d’être of this internal organ is to
control the managerial team on behalf of distant stockholders.
Following this line, independence—as a way to prevent collusion
between the controllers (board members) and the controlled
(managers)—came to be a cornerstone of corporate governance
reforms. The difficulty is that it is hard to give a precise content to
the concept of independence. Yet institutional investors need clear
signs, visible from a distance. Among these signs, the absence of
relationships with management is favoured. But as Roberts,
McNulty and Stiles (2005) note, such an approach to independence
tends to limit the involvement and commitment of non-executive
directors in corporate affairs. In turn, this means a rather weak
knowledge of the firm and of its productive and commercial
dynamics. The assessment of the board of directors offered by the
doctrine of shareholder primacy is therefore paradoxical in that it
advocates an increasing exteriority for this internal mode of
control. As argued before, this exteriority reduces the effectiveness
of the board as a control mechanism. But it is even more damaging
for its strategic role, which remains—contrary to the claim of the
10
agency theorists—an essential part of the job.

10

For a critique of this exclusive focus on the control role of the board, and more
broadly of the agency approach to the board, see the special issue of the British
Journal of Management, vol. 16 and, in particular, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles
(2005) and Huse (2005).
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The in-depth study conducted by Roberts et al. (2005)
demonstrates that if independence is a crucial feature for nonexecutive directors, it should be understood as a ‘willingness to
exercise independence of mind in relation to executive strategy
and performance’ (p. 19). And this willingness is only possible if
the directors’ knowledge about the company and its management
is strong enough. Accordingly, as Roberts et al. (2005) logically
conclude: ‘[…] the advocacy by institutional investors, policy
advisors and the business media of greater non-executive
independence may be too crude or even counter-productive’ (p. 19).
Consequently, it should come as no surprise that performance
studies have failed to reveal any relationship between board
composition and firm performance. Worse, some studies suggest
that there may be a damaging influence of independent directors:
Fernandes (2005), for example, finds for listed Portuguese
companies that executive compensation increases with the
number of independent directors and that the relationship
between this compensation and firm performance is stronger in
firms with no independent board members.
Considering the case of the high profile corporate scandals, we find
clear evidence that the lack of reliable knowledge by independent
directors was one of the driving forces behind control failure. As
already mentioned, Enron’s board contained 12 independent
directors out of a total of 14, in the last months. Their
incompetence appears to be more striking than their dishonesty.
The case of the LJMs (LJM1 and LJM2)—private investment funds
created at the instigation of Enron’s executives—and the Raptors
is a conspicuous example. The objective of the four Raptor
operations, initiated in June 2000, was to hide losses related to
depreciated investments. Approximately $1 billion in losses was
transferred in this way. A Special Purpose Entity (SPE), intended to
receive the assets that Enron wanted to hedge, was created for
each operation (Raptor I, II, III and IV). Each time, funding of the
SPE came from two sources: a contribution from Enron in the
form of pledges of Enron stock and call options, and $30 million in
liquid assets from LJM2. LJM2’s investment was nevertheless
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accompanied by a commitment to repay within six months with a
premium of $11 million (to make a total reimbursement of $41
million). Consequently, Enron stock was the only tangible capital
that the Raptors had for hedging Enron assets. In short, Enron
‘hedged’ itself, counter to all financial logic. The board of directors
was informed of all these transactions. But instead of worrying,
the board appeared to be quite enthusiastic. Thus, we learn in the
Report of the U.S. Senate on “The role of the board of directors in
Enron’s collapse” (2002) that one of the board members suggested
that Enron’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) file “a patent” on the
accounting techniques used in the Raptor operations (p.21, note
47). Later, in his hearing with the Senate Committee, this director
would qualify the Raptor operation as ‘leading hedge accounting’
(p. 20). All in all, LJM2’s first six months of business brought
Enron a profit of $200 million. As the US Senate Report notes,
‘…[no] Directors asked how LJM was able to produce such huge
funds flow with such minimal effort by [Enron’s CFO]’ (p. 33).
This lack of understanding of what was going on inside the firm by
non-executive board members might be contrasted with the
reaction of Enron’s employees. Employees, by definition, have
access to specific and tacit knowledge, the foundation of effective
monitoring. In particular, one employee, Sherron Watkins—vice
president of corporate development—was aware of the extent of
fraudulent behaviour. However, she did not have any formal right
to express her concerns publicly. She feared for her job and so
decided to write an anonymous letter to Kenneth Lay (Enron
CEO), concluding: ‘We’re such a crooked company’. This story
reveals an important aspect of the internal balance of power in US
corporations, and in the shareholder-friendly model in general
(Windolf, 2004): the lack of internal countervailing powers. The
US model of corporate governance does not grant any rights to
sustain the voice of non-shareholder constituencies, and in
particular the workers. This marks a major difference with the
European continental model, characterized by worker involvement
in corporate governance (Rebérioux 2002): as a constituent
element, workers have the right to be informed and consulted
about the main issues in the functioning of the firm. Possibly,
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they may be granted a power of co-determination on a more or less
wide range of subjects, through elected representatives. Through
these rights, managers are induced (or forced) to take the interests
of employees into account when making their decisions.
Corporate governance is directly affected: these rights to
information, consultation and co-determination contribute, when
they exist, to the definition of a specific aim for the exercise of
power within companies, in which the maximization of the wellbeing of shareholders is not taken to be the required norm. But
there is more: worker involvement provides at least some internal
countervailing powers. This is evident in the case of
codetermination in the form of board-level participation (on the
supervisory board, as in Germany, or on the board of directors, as
in Sweden). But it is true for the information and consultation
rights granted to works councils. From this point of view, France
is a good example. Article L.431 of the Labour Code, for example,
requires the employer to provide the works council with the
information it may wish to obtain on the general functioning of
the company. This information plays an important role in the ex
post control, conducted by judges, of the legal validity of economic
lay-offs. Another important right is the possibility for the works
council to call in an expert accountant, in order to obtain a
counter-valuation of the information communicated by the
employer. As Grumbach (1995) notes, this right challenges the
‘employer’s monopoly on legitimate expertise’.11

B. THE CASE OF EXTERNAL GATEKEEPERS
It is now widely accepted that conflicts of interest—in particular
for external auditors and securities analysts—did play a role in the
failure of gatekeepers during the Enron-era financial scandals.

11

On some aspects, the information rights enjoyed by the work council are even
greater than those of shareholders: for example, managers must inform worker
representatives (and not the shareholders) whenever the trade of a block holding
is expected.
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However, it is part of our argument that the failure of these
gatekeepers cannot be reduced solely to this dimension. Even
when it is carefully performed, gatekeeper control cannot
supervise the whole process of profit formation inside the firm.
This argument is clear-cut in the case of rating agencies and
financial analysts, who rely mainly on publicly available
information. It is their processing of this information that proves
useful for investors. But this can hardly be enough to define them
as watchdogs of corporate activity12. The following quotation by
Leo C. O'Neill, President of Standard and Poor's illustrates this
point:
Obviously S&P and the other rating agencies were
evaluating Enron, so it was fair enough to include us. My
view is that the [Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee's] report ascribed a watchdog role to S&P
that no one, including us, ever intended S&P to have.
That's not our job. We are recipients of the information
that is generated by the companies, approved by their
auditors, and sanctioned by their legal counsel. We
believe we have every right to rely on the disclosures
they make to the SEC. We also, as you know, meet with
companies and ask them a lot of questions. But quite
honestly, they have absolutely no obligation to disclose
to us. And we have no right to impose any kind of
sanctions or legal constraints [to make them disclose]’
(CFO Magazine January 1, 2003).
The same comment might apply to securities analysts. The
cognitive limitations of these actors—combined with their
influence on stock price determination—form the basis of the
assumption of a ‘cognitive bias’. Moreton and Zenger (2004) have

12

For a radical academic view, see Partnoy (2001), who considers that “credit
ratings are of scant informational value” (p.1). I would like to thank Ludovic
Moreau for this reference.
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set up this hypothesis in the case of securities analysts.
Specifically, they test the proposition that analysts discount
‘unfamiliar (corporate) strategies’, which combine assets from a
priori unrelated business. These cross-sector strategies are, by
definition, difficult for analysts to understand. Accordingly, the
more diversified a firm is, the less it will be covered by analysts. In
turn, one may argue that stock price evaluation is positively
correlated with the number of analysts covering the firm. The
conclusion is that securities analysts tend to restrain managerial
strategy, in favour of ‘familiar’ strategies… that are not necessarily
profit-maximizing. Indeed, it is a persistent message of
organisational theory and resource-based theory of the firm that
the production and preservation of organizational rent are closely
related to business models favouring the original combination of
assets. As a general principle, the growing role of knowledge and
intangible assets in rent production widens the gap between the
gatekeepers’ evaluation and the reality of the business firm,
leading to a deepening of cognitive bias.
Even in the case of auditors, more closely connected to the firm
than rating agencies and financial analysts, we may cast doubt on
the proposition that their failure is solely due to (remediable)
conflicts of interest. For sure, the auditors’ assessment is partly
based on private information and on-going relations with
executive officers. For this reason, rating agencies and analysts
regularly complain that they are at the end of the ‘informational
chain’, laying responsibility for the high-profile corporate scandals
mainly at the door of the auditors. However, the power of auditors,
their ability to monitor corporate managers and to detect deviant
behaviour, should not be over-estimated. The following extract, by
Mary Locatelli—former executive vice president and director of
audit at American Savings Bank—is instructive: ‘External auditors
focus after the fact on a distinct event (a set of financial
statements) and ask the question ‘What, if anything, went wrong?’’
(CPA Journal, October 2002). Thus, audit firms provide for an ex
post, rather than ex ante, monitoring activity. This is to be
contrasted with internal auditors, who ‘focus on an ongoing
process and assess risks and controls to answer the question ‘What
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could go wrong?’’ Locatelli then concludes: ‘Outsiders are not
insiders […]. A lack of appreciation and understanding leads
companies to leave controls to outside experts’.
To conclude, the information used by stock markets to evaluate
business conduct and performance is produced by actors that are,
by their very nature, at a distance from the productive process. As
such, they suffer from intrinsic cognitive limitations. Reliable
knowledge about the business firm is to be acquired, in a large
part, inside the firm as a productive entity combining specific
competences and tacit knowledge. By trying to empower liquid
investors, shareholder primacy contributes to ‘externalize’ the
sources of information about and control of business conduct. As
such, it undermines its effectiveness as an accountabilityenhancing arrangement.

V. MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOUR UNDER SHAREHOLDER
PRIMACY
The argument developed so far helps to explain the opportunity for
fraudulent behaviours under shareholder primacy. However, to
understand how those behaviours become effective, we need to
appreciate more clearly the constraint imposed on business
conduct through the stock markets. Essentially, the power of
financial markets is expressed by the imposition of constraining
criteria of financial returns. The competition among investment
funds to attract collective savings is transferred onto the
companies, which are judged by these funds on the basis of their
ability to meet the financial demands imposed on them. This
power is conferred by stock market liquidity, which allows a
continuous process of public evaluation of companies (Orléan,
1999; Deakin, 2005).
An analysis of the implications of the most popular ‘Value-Based
Management’ tool—Economic Value Added (EVA)—may prove to
be particularly useful: indeed, this metric condenses the logic of
(stock) market control over listed companies. The first function of
EVA is informational: it is considered to be the most relevant
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criterion for the prediction of stock market prices. The second
function is operational: EVA is set down as the management
criterion for executives, who must seek to maximize the
difference between financial profitability (the return on equity)
and the cost of capital (see infra). The latter is no longer
considered as a consequence of the firm's productive and
commercial operations, determined ex post. Rather, the cost of
capital is considered as a benchmark in itself, determined ex ante.
The use of benchmarking thus provides financial investors with
the ability to undertake a continuous and generalised comparison
between listed companies.
The assumption that there are no tax deductions or exceptional
results simplifies the calculation, so that the current result merges
with the net result. Let us denote Ro the operating result, D the
book value of debts, r their average costs, EC the book value of
equity capital, k the equilibrium return on equity capital as
determined by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)13 and K
the total book value of the assets (D + EC). Then it is possible to
obtain the following expressions for the net result (R) and the
weighted average capital cost (WACC):
R = Ro - r.D

(1)

WACC = k. EC / K + r. D / K = k - (k - r).D/K

(2)

The simplest expression of a company’s EVA is then the following:
EVA = R - k.EC

(3)

MVA is defined as the discounted total (using the WACC) of
excepted EVA. By denoting ROE the return on equity (R / EC) and

13

The CAPM, developed in the 1960s (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965), permits the
calculation of the premium which rational investors expect for holding risky
assets (with high volatility).
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ROA the return on assets (R / K), expression (3) can be rewritten
as:
EVA = (ROE - k).EC = (ROA - WACC).K

(4)

Equation (3) brings out the specific nature of EVA: while the
wealth going to shareholders is normally measured by net return
(R, that is the profit once the employees have been paid and the
debts serviced), the EVA indicator is based on the idea that the
value actually created for shareholders is anything in excess of the
profitability demanded by the capital market (k.EC). In other
words, if the effective return on investment (the ROE) is the rate
k, which corresponds to the equilibrium market return for that
class of risk, then the EVA model considers that no value has been
created (see 4). Likewise, if the investment is ultimately
remunerated at a rate n with 0 < n < k, then there is destruction of
value: there is some return on investment, but less than the
market has the right to expect. The difference is identified as a
loss, even if shareholders are paid for their investment. The
market return at equilibrium (k) becomes a minimal return or an
opportunity cost, ‘always to be exceeded’ (Batsch, 1999, p. 36).
This has two far-reaching consequences.
On the one hand, the systematization of the EVA model results in
a profound modification of the status of shareholders. As Lordon
(2000) notes, creation of value means that shareholders are paid
twice: once at the opportunity cost k and again at the EVA.
Through the EVA, residual creditors therefore become privileged
creditors, as if they were lenders. They acquire guarantees of
returns on their investments (k) and although these guarantees are
not contractual, they do constrain managerial strategies14. This

14

On this point, see for more details Froud, Haslam, Johal and Williams (2000).
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change, it should be noted, further undermines the traditional
15
economic justification for shareholder sovereignty: risk-taking .
On the other hand, the creation of shareholder value originates in
a logic of imbalance transformed into a permanent objective. The
macro-economic inconsistency of this principle is obvious: not all
the (listed) companies can create value for their shareholders,
whatever the quality of their management. At the micro-economic
level, methods for doping financial returns beyond what the
companies’ economic potential would permit are sustained by
elevated stock-exchange prices. These methods combine the
increase of the debt-to-equity ratio (financial leverage), the assetlight strategy and the repurchase of shares. If the interest rate r is
below k, an increase in the debt-to-equity ratio reduces the WACC
(see equation 2) and thus raises the EVA (see 4). The asset light
strategy (∆ K < 0) automatically raises the return on assets (ROA),
while the repurchase of shares increases the return on equity
(ROE). Both result in a rise in the EVA (see equation 4). All of
these methods were extensively used by Enron’s officers. Clearly,
none of them are sustainable over the medium-to-long term.
These are short-term strategies with the aim of generating
financial returns beyond the market equilibrium. As such, they are
highly risky and encourage bold innovations flaunting acceptable
standards of caution.
Let us sum up our main argument. If capital markets have
increased their ability to obtain results (in terms of financial
return), they are limited in their ability to appreciate the way in
which these requirements are met. This contributes to making
managerial power less accountable: financial irregularities
multiply and executive remunerations explode. Shareholder

15

In the introduction, we emphasised a complementary argument, implying that
shareholders are not the unique risk-bearer in the firm: the growth of human
capital specificity in a context of contractual incompleteness.
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primacy fails exactly where it strives to succeed: it reinforces the
discretionary power of managers rather than limiting it.

VI. CONCLUSION
Share prices are fundamentally perceptions of value. The primary
concern of managers accountable solely to the shareholders is
therefore to influence these perceptions. Accordingly, the crucial
question is the information upon which these perceptions are
formed. We have argued that in a market-based model of corporate
governance, this information is essentially produced by outsiders.
In the context of a liquid stock market, monitoring by investors
through long-term block holding is not feasible. In addition, and
by definition, workers are out of the game: it is hard to ask them
to monitor managers to ensure the latter create value for
shareholders. Yet it is a relentless message of organizational
theory that the wealth creation process and corporate profits are
part of a complex cognitive dynamics hardly observable at a
distance—an insight we can trace back to Berle and Means (1932),
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) or Galbraith (1973). The revival of
non-contractarian, cognitive-based theories of the firm—with the
resource-based approach or evolutionary theory—should reinforce
the scepticism towards shareholder primacy (see for example
O’Sullivan, 2000A and 2000B; Grandori, 2004; Aglietta and
Rebérioux, 2005). Indeed, cognitive approaches explore the way in
which the firm constructs, maintains and develops tacit and
collective productive knowledge. The competitiveness of the firm
then depends on the quality of this ‘cognitive’ process, that is to
say a process of collective (organizational) learning. The fact that
such an approach leads to a rejection of shareholder primacy
should come as no surprise.
Besides the intrinsic limitations of shareholder primacy in
generating an effective supervising environment, we have stressed
another crucial feature of finance-led capitalism: the power of
capital markets is expressed through the definition of ex ante
financial requirements, which lead corporate executives to pursue
highly risky strategies. Weak control on one side and strong
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pressure on the other: taken together, these features create a
highly favourable configuration for fraudulent behaviours. Hence
the paradox: the greater the implementation of shareholder
sovereignty, the less corporate executives are effectively
accountable. In other words, it is our argument that instability is
an inherent defect of shareholder primacy.
Some perennial questions in the field of corporate governance and
corporate law are observable. Managerial accountability is one of
these—if not the most important. As Cheffins (2004) notes, there
is something cyclical about this issue, which casts doubts on the
idea that corporate law and, more broadly, the theory of the firm is
on a constant progressive trend. From this point of view, new
developments in the theory of the firm, together with the current
evolution in corporate practices and business conduct, may well
deeply influence the way corporate accountability is understood—
after long domination by the shareholder primacy principle.
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